INTRODUCTION
The Ministry of Health (MOH) Singapore, it is a requirement for a BSL 3 laboratory to be inspected yearly, certified and registered with the MOH as a certified facility.
The MOH allows appeal for use of some high risk biological agents in a BSL 2 laboratory with BSL 3 practices.
A special permit is issued specifying certain instructions or requirements and the laboratory is registered as an uncertified or BSL 2+ facility. The IBC needs to submit annual report to the MOH for those BSL 3 and BSL 2+ facilities. 
BIOSAFETY ISSUES
Under the University's Health Safety and Environment (HSE) Steering Committee, the IBC looks into biosafety issues and advises the University on all biological and related matters. The Office of Health and Safety (OHS) plays the role of IBC Secretariat. The IBC and the OHS conduct audits, routine inspections and unscheduled checks for any biological work to ensure all the risks are adequately addressed and additionally seeks to assure the senior management that all foreseeable risks are taken under control. All biological project proposals are reviewed -by the IBC and registered with the Biological Project Number (BPN) on the online application system. BPN Administrators are appointed at every school or research center to monitor biological projects and to facilitate the administrative process between the researchers and IBC on biosafety issues.
PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
As a start, there is a need to do gap analysis of the requirements of good biological research laboratories and the developed institutional standard for both facilities requirement and practices.
This program (gap analysis) was implemented to fulfil the following objectives. The gaps noted in the audit of laboratories provide each lab with the continual improvement targets to ensure that the safety of the workers and also the integrity of the biological samples handled. 
COMMON AUDIT FINDINGS AND COMMENTS
Audit was carried out using the simplified checklist.
Common findings and some areas which need safety improvements were summarized in Table 2 Hand wash facility: A designated hand washing sink was not available in some laboratories (16.5%; 22 out of 133) (Fig. 2 ). There are facilities comprising a large main laboratory made up of many small isolated rooms equipped with biological safety cabinet for purpose of handling biological agent. But there were no hand wash sink available nearby Disposal of liquid biological waste into lab sink after disinfecting with chlorine or other disinfectants. Toxic industrial waste (TIW) are not to discard to sewage.
(28.5%)
Lack of proper hand over or take over practice; when a project has ended or a researcher leaves, all associated biological samples or stuff shall either be transferred to another researcher or inactivated and disposed of. It was noted that many used BSC as a storage facilities by keeping laboratory apparatus and stuff not required for experiment. There were no clean, dirty and working zones being practiced (Fig. 3) .
Autoclave: It was found that a legislation requirement has been duly met since autoclaves (pressured vessels) in all schools or centers bore MOM issued inspection certificates.
Despite the mandatory inspection, poor maintenance of autoclave corroded with dirty water inside was observed (Fig.   4A ). An operating procedure detailing responsibilities, proper maintenance and cleaning of autoclave should be in place, especially so if the autoclave is a shared facility by many different users.
Centrifuge:
The centrifuge should be properly maintained and kept clean all times. It was noted that some centrifuges were lack of proper maintenance ( Transportation of loaded centrifuge bucket should be carried out with care using secondary containment and trolley as required.
Good Microbiological Practices (GMP)
Laboratory coat: It was noted in the audit that some laboratory only impose wearing of laboratory coat only when user conducts an experiment. Person not doing laboratory work or visitor including contractor is allowed to enter the laboratory without wearing a laboratory coat and moving close to the biological work activities, ignoring the possi- It was noted that some researchers used liquid nitrogen for storage of biological items without applying cryogenic gloves or face shield. It was also observed that used N95 mask was left on the bench together with other contaminated items (Fig. 5) . It is very important not to touch inner part of the N95 mask and used one should be disposed of immediately after its use. In case of reusable mask, the mask should be sanitized and sealed in plastic bag and kept away separately.
Proper use of personal protective equipment must be practiced.
Bio-waste disposal: It was observed that solid biological wastes are collected by the bio-waste contractor without autoclaving or inactivation, departing from required practice under the NTU biological manual (27.8%; 37 out of 133). This is not a good practice as it can cause laboratory acquired infection (LAI) especially during transportation and also possibility of third party (such as a waste collection worker or members of the public) being infected. It is advised that all bio-waste should be autoclaved, inactivated or decontaminated before leaving the laboratory and/or the facility. Storage of contaminated biologically active wastes with other chemical wastes also increased the risk of contamination and propagation resulting in widespread infection to non-suspecting persons. Bio-waste should be autoclaved cultures, stocks and reagents that no one is aware of (Fig.   6 ). It is necessary to develop and practice hand over and take over procedure when a principal investigator, researcher or student leaves such that all biological agents are properly accounted for and adequately dealt with. 6 . When a project has ended or a researcher leaves, all associated biological stock and retained samples shall either be transferred to another researcher or inactivated and disposed of. The lack of such practices results in accumulation of remaining bacterial cultures, stocks and reagents that no one is aware of.
LABORATORY CERTIFICATION
The "BSL 2 Certification Criteria" document was deve- (Fig. 7) .
FUTURE BIOSAFETY IMPROVEMENTS
There is a need to raise commitment to biosafety for laboratory users at multiple levels. Biosafety training, registration of certified NTU BSL 2 laboratories, biological project registration (BPN) process, biosafety measures and practices are important areas which demand continuous improvements.
It will be also required to get the "NTU Safety Manual for Biological Work" reviewed and updated with information based on important outcomes of this program. Review of current online biosafety course which is an internal training for NTU laboratory users, may be needed to ensure that it can be a useful platform for integration to future national "Biosafety Passport" program. Above all, there is a constant need to ensure good practices are implemented with the principal investigators and lab managers being key drivers in this process.
CONCLUSIONS
Basic equipment required for biological research works are provided at NTU laboratories. Laboratory facility is mostly adequate and sufficient for safe handling of biological agent with lower risk provided that proper maintenance of equipment and good microbiological practices are in place.
As laboratories, including NTU's labs, are to move forward and handle more novel, innovative and perhaps more virulence substances, there is a constant need to train our researchers and to mold the new safety culture in biological and biomedical research to be vigilant and adhere to good microbiological practices.
Commitment toward biosafety has been inconsistent and insufficient at multiple levels. Individual schools/centers, teams and research groups have taken it upon themselves to implement biosafety practices, but this is not done in a consistent manner. Integrated safety culture and a standardized biosafety practice needs to be established. This is an expectation of the program and all persons from the top 
